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Comment  Irene Brambilla
Much has been speculated and argued in light of China’s exceptional growth 
and progressive integration into world markets. The discussion has ranged 
from competition eﬀects, whereby China may be crowding other countries 
out both as recipients of foreign direct investment (FDI) and as suppliers 
in international markets, to positive eﬀects such as the increase in business 
opportunities and the potentially huge expansion in demand for commodi-
ties.
Within this broad topic, Hanson and Robertson look into a very speciﬁ  c 
question: the eﬀect of China’s expansion in the manufacturing exports of a 
selected group of ten developing countries. They perform a neat and simple 
empirical exercise where they ﬁ  rst estimate a gravity equation model and 
then run a counterfactual exercise to simulate what demand for exports of 
these ten countries would have been in the absence of China’s relative expan-
sion during the last decade.
Results are sobering. They show that, on average, manufacturing exports 
of the ten selected industrialized economies would have been only 1.6 per-
cent higher (0.8 percent on a diﬀerent speciﬁ  cation) had China not expanded 
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between 1995 and 2005. Results vary by country, with the eﬀect being largest 
for Romania: the impact of China on Romanian manufacturing exports 
is 3.3 percent. The most unusual case is Sri Lanka, where the impact on 
exports is positive.
In December 2001, China signed its much anticipated accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). How are Hanson and Robertson’s results 
compatible with this event? How does it happen that the most-  populated, 
fastest-  growing country in the world has such seemingly small impact on 
international markets?
Supply-  Side Factors versus Market Access
One answer is that Hanson and Robertson’s counterfactual exercise is not 
designed to simulate China’s accession to the WTO, or, more generally, to 
simulate China’s newly granted market access. It is a supply-  side exercise. 
They look at export supply capacity.
It is worth taking a look at how export supply capacity enters into the 
gravity equation. Let us consider a pair of countries, Mexico and the United 
States, for example. Exports from Mexico to the United States in a particular 
industry depend on three factors: (a) demand conditions in the United 
States, given by the share of the industry in total consumption, by income 
in the United States, and by what is being oﬀered by Mexico’s competitors; 
(b) Mexico’s supply capacity, that is, the cost of production and availability 
of varieties in Mexico; (c) ﬁ  nally, gravity-  type variables such as bilateral 
distance, cultural barriers, and trade policy variables (i.e., tariﬀs) also play a 
role. Demand conditions conceptually refer to residual demand conditions, 
that is, U.S. demand for Mexican products given the “state” of Mexico’s 
competitors, including China. Thus, residual demand for Mexican products 
depends on among other things, the varieties and prices oﬀered by China, 
where prices are determined by production costs, tariﬀs, distance, and other 
gravity- type  variables.
Here is where the counterfactual exercise comes into place. The exercise 
compares 1995 and 2005. In actuality, between 1995 and 2005, conditions in 
China and in other countries change. In the counterfactual exercise, Mexi-
co’s exports to the United States are simulated for the year 2005 using some 
of China’s conditions in 1995. This is later aggregated across industries and 
countries of destination, to compute the total impact on Mexico’s exports 
by comparing actual exports in 2005 with simulated exports in that same 
year.
The distinction between supply capacity and market access refers to 
which conditions are kept constant at their 1995 level and which conditions 
are allowed to vary. Hanson and Robertson choose to keep the number of 
varieties and costs of production constant at their 1995 level, thus focusing 
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in tariﬀs that occurred between 1995 and 2005. The supply-  side factors 
can be broadly understood as improvements in infrastructure, information 
technology, regulation, human capital, and other variables that aﬀect pro-
duction costs. An alternative question could look at the impacts of change 
in market access. In this exercise, the counterfactual exports of 2005 would 
be generated using the tariﬀs of 1995, and, as expected, would yield higher 
impacts on the exports of the selected ten countries, Mexico included among 
them.
There is a small caveat to the export supply capacity counterfactual 
exercise. Supply-  side conditions are not exogenous of market access and 
gravity-  type variables. In the model, the number of varieties is an equilib-
rium result, determined jointly with prices and quantities and aﬀected by 
market access variables such as tariﬀs. If we consider that tariﬀs faced by 
China fell between 1995 and 2005, the measured increase in export supply 
capacity is partially an endogenous response to the tariﬀ change, and the 
counterfactual estimates provide an upper bound. Additionally, demand-
  side conditions are estimated as an exporter dummy, which in the model 
is well determined but in practice can capture unobserved market access 
variables such as nontariﬀ barriers that might have also changed between 
1995 and 2005. The textile and apparel sectors are examples where nontariﬀ 
barriers dropped between 1995 and 2005.
Looking into Speciﬁ  c Industries
Diﬀerences across industries are another point to consider. China’s expan-
sion has been far from homogeneous. Between 1995 and 2005, changes in 
China’s market share in world exports have ranged from a decrease of 68 
to an increase of 73 percentage points across Harmonized System (HS) 
six-  digit products in the COMTRADE data set. Of nearly 5,000 HS six-
  digit products with positive exports from China in both years, the increase 
in market share has been below 2 percentage points for over half of them, 
while for forty-  eight product lines, the increase in China’s market share has 
been above 40 percentage points. Naturally, these forty-  eight industries are 
at greater risk of suﬀering a large negative impact from China’s expansion 
in supply. The extent of the impact on aggregate countrywide results in the 
ten countries subject to study depends on the importance of the industries 
where China’s expansion has been largest in these countries’ composition 
of exports.
Table 4.3 in the paper reports the ﬁ  ve most important industries in each of 
the ten selected countries, deﬁ  ned as the ﬁ  ve industries with largest share in 
total exports. By showing that these industries are not as important within 
China’s exports, Hanson and Robertson support their claim that there is 
not much overlap between China’s and the ten countries’ composition of 
exports.162        Gordon H. Hanson and Raymond Robertson
It is potentially more informative to look at this from the angle of changes 
in China’s market shares in world exports. Column (1) in table 4C.1 shows 
the correlation between two variables: (a) changes in China’s market share 
in world exports between 1995 and 2005; and (b) the participation of each 
product in total country exports for each of the ten countries.1 Observa-
tions are deﬁ  ned at the HS six-  digit level. The coeﬃcients are very close 
to zero, indicating that industries in which China has expanded are of low 
relative importance within the exporting structure of each country. Column 
(2) shows analogous correlations using ranks of products instead of shares. 
This result is consistent with ﬁ  nding a low aggregate impact of China on 
total country exports.
Column (3) looks at the forty-  eight product lines in which the market 
share of China has increased by more than 40 percentage points. These are 
the products that are more at risk of suﬀering the impact of China’s expan-
sion. For each of the ten countries, HS six-  digit product lines are sorted 
in order of importance according to their share in total country exports. 
Column (3) displays the position in the ranking of the ﬁ  rst product that 
overlaps with the products in which China’s expansion has been largest. In 
the case of Hungary, for example, the result is 195. This means that none of 
Hungary’s 194 most important product lines are among the “highly endan-
gered products” for which the share of China has increased by more than 
40 percentage points.









(2)    
Hungary –0.023 –0.0201 195
Sri Lanka –0.035 0.0223 119
Mexico 0.002 0.1048 31
Malaysia 0.0262 0.111 19
The Philippines 0.0169 0.1137 155
Poland –0.0006 0.0569 76
Romania –0.0066 0.0116 223
Thailand 0.0497 0.1987 31
  Turkey   0.0294   0.1048   43  
Source: UN COMTRADE.
1. Let m, l, and h denote value of imports, industries and HS six-  digit products. The ﬁ  rst 
variable is deﬁ  ned as (mh,China,2005/ imh,i,2005) – (mh,China,1995/ imh,i,1995). The second variable is 
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large expansion of Chinese exports and products in which the ten coun-
tries specialize, which largely explains the low aggregate numbers. These 
empirical facts are consistent with the econometric ﬁ  ndings in the paper 
obtained using structural methods. Additionally, they suggest that, albeit 
low in aggregate, the impact of China’s expansion is potentially large in 
speciﬁ  c industries and in countries in which the composition of exports is 
more similar to China’s.